I. INTRODUCTION
The home mortgage interest deduction, "America's favorite tax break," 1 should come to a necessary and deserved end in any comprehensive tax reform package Congress adopts. 2 With fundamental tax reform touted as a vehicle for increasing economic competitiveness, lowering tax rates, closing part of the federal budget deficit, and making tax compliance simpler, 3 members of both major political parties are scrutinizing costly 2. See infra Part III. For a brief discussion of how bad provisions make their way into the tax code and rarely ever go away, see BERNARD SALANIÉ, THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 156-57 (1st ed. 2003) (explaining that legislators have an incentive to make tax burdens and benefits so hard for the public to understand that populist opposition to the tax system cannot emerge).
3. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR, AND COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES 3 (2008) (" [T] he minimal requirement for a tax system should be that it raises sufficient revenue to pay for government expenditures. A good tax system ought to do so fairly, keeping its costs of compliance and administration as low as feasible. It ought to be conducive to economic growth. Finally, it ought to . . . interfer[e] minimally with private decision making. Our nation's tax system fails on every count.").
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[VOL. 49: 1333, 2012] Transition Relief for Tax Reform's Third Rail SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW tax carve-outs like the mortgage interest deduction. 4 The deduction makes a compelling target. Tax policy experts on both the left and right agree that the mortgage interest deduction fails to meaningfully increase the homeownership rate despite the substantial subsidy for many homeowners. 5 Rather than helping renters on the cusp of ownership purchase a home, 6 the mortgage interest deduction merely subsidizes those who would likely buy homes without a subsidy. 7 These large subsidies for only a portion of homeowners carry harmful secondary social and economic effects. 8 Homeowners with the deduction, for instance, can purchase larger, more expensive homes than they would otherwise. 9 And where housing stock is limited, that subsidized demand drives housing inflation and actually reduces homeownership rates among almost all socioeconomic groups. 10 The inducement to purchase larger homes on larger lots also spurs overdevelopment of traffic-causing, open-space-razing suburban sprawl. In spite of the mortgage interest deduction's shortcomings, congressional policymakers are understandably reluctant to reform it. 12 Beyond anxiety about changing a popular tax break, Congress must also worry that reforming the deduction will affect the already-battered housing market, 13 as well as homeowners who rely on the deduction each year.
14 Those considerations should not, however, stop Congress from reforming the mortgage interest deduction. Rather, Congress should use tax reform as an opportunity to set the housing market on a more sustainable long-term path and prevent the next housing crisis, in part by reforming the mortgage interest deduction. 15 This future benefit need not result in immediate pain; Congress can reform the mortgage interest deduction and protect the short-term housing market by adopting appropriate transition relief. 16 This Comment argues that Congress should-in this order of preference-eliminate the mortgage interest deduction, replace it with a credit, or substantially modify it, and that Congress can adopt any of these policies without substantial short-term fallout in the housing 14. See Steverman, supra note 1. In 2008, over 70% of homeowners with mortgages claimed the deduction. Sahadi, supra note 1.
15. See ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE GREAT AMERICAN HOUSING BUBBLE: THE ROAD TO COLLAPSE 131-37 (2011) (discussing the inflationary role the mortgage interest deduction plays in the housing market and identifying it as "the tax provision which contributed most to the American Housing Bubble (and thus also to its ultimate collapse)"). Because of the societal difficulty identifying and seriously addressing speculative bubbles while they are occurring, the only effective strategy is for policymakers to target the conditions that create such bubbles in the first place. ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: HOW TODAY'S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND market. Part II of this Comment examines how the mortgage interest deduction works, its history, and its intended benefits. Part III scrutinizes the deduction's inability to achieve its primary objective-increasing homeownership-and examines its negative effects on housing prices, household indebtedness, the environment, and wealth disparity. Accordingly, this Part argues that Congress should reform the deduction, discusses three basic options available for doing so, and introduces the long-term and short-term considerations that Congress must account for when adopting a new policy. Part IV discusses each of Congress's general options-eliminating the deduction, replacing it with a credit, or substantially modifying the deduction-and analyzes each option in light of continued housing market weakness. Ultimately, the analysis in Part IV concludes that Congress should reform the mortgage interest tax deduction by completely phasing it out over a number of years, with a trigger for the phase-out based on a metric of housing market health. Part V summarizes how completely phasing out the deduction will accomplish the twin objectives of long-term housing market health and accommodating the market's current fragility.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION

A. How the Deduction Works
The Internal Revenue Code (the Code) only permits deductions for one type of personal debt, "qualified residence interest." 17 The Code defines qualified residence interest as interest arising from "acquisition indebtedness" or "home equity indebtedness" on a qualified residence.
18
Acquisition indebtedness is purchase, construction, or improvement debt that is secured by a qualified residence. 19 Home equity indebtedness is any nonacquisition indebtedness secured by the residence that does not exceed the difference between the fair market value and the acquisition
Common examples would be a fixed-or variable-rate mortgage to purchase a home or a second mortgage a homeowner uses to remodel. Acquisition indebtedness can also include debt remaining after refinancing a loan, but only to the extent of the unpaid principal before the homeowner refinanced. William T. indebtedness. 20 Under the Code, a homeowner can deduct interest on up to $1 million in acquisition indebtedness 21 and the first $100,000 in home equity indebtedness. 22 Thus, a homeowner can potentially deduct interest on up to $1.1 million of home-secured debt. 23 However, the tax privilege for mortgage debt is not limited to a taxpayer's principal residence alone; a "qualified residence" includes both a taxpayer's principal residence and one other residence selected by the taxpayer.
24
As a tax deduction, the mortgage interest deduction does not reduce tax liability dollar-for-dollar, as tax credits do. 25 Instead, a deduction reduces taxable income by an amount directly proportional to a taxpayer's income tax rate. 26 Consider the following example: On January 1, 2011, Alice and Ben each purchased a home with a $200,000 mortgage at 5% interest. The interest cost to each taxpayer was $10,000 in the first year. Alice made $100,000 in 2011 and paid at the 28% tax rate, whereas Ben made $50,000 and paid at the 15% tax rate. Under the mortgage interest deduction, Alice received a tax benefit of 28% of $10,000, or $2,800. Ben received a tax benefit of 15% of $10,000, or $1,500. In other words, of every dollar Alice spent on mortgage interest, the federal government gave twenty-eight cents back to her, while Ben received only fifteen cents back for every dollar he spent on mortgage interest in 2011. 27 20. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(i). An example would be a loan of $50,000 secured by a residence where the market value of the residence is $500,000 and the amount of acquisition indebtedness is $450,000. Unlike acquisition indebtedness, home equity indebtedness is not limited in what the proceeds may be used for. See id. § 163(h)(3)(C). It was this "interest-free" home equity cash homeowners used during the housing bubble to finance cars, boats, SUVs, wide-screen televisions, vacations, et cetera. Accordingly, the higher one's income tax rate, the greater the proportional benefit from the deduction.
28
To claim the mortgage interest deduction, taxpayers must itemize their taxes, which is only financially worthwhile if their total itemized deductions exceed the value of the standard deduction. 29 Returning to the example of Alice and Ben, both taxpayers would itemize for tax year 2011 because the $10,000 of mortgage interest they paid exceeds the standard deduction, which was $5,800 for single taxpayers. 30 Cynthia, a taxpayer who also purchased a home in 2011 with a $100,000 mortgage, a 5% interest rate, and thus $5,000 in mortgage interest, would only itemize if she had other deductions totaling more than $5,800. For Cynthia, the mortgage interest deduction provides no value unless combined with other deductions.
31
This barrier-the need for itemized deductions to exceed the standard deduction-prevents nonitemizing homeowners from actually benefitting from the mortgage interest deduction.
32
B. History of the "Accidental Deduction"
33
In 2013, the mortgage interest deduction will celebrate its one hundredth anniversary as part of the federal tax code. 34 Contrary to what its long history might suggest, the mortgage interest deduction is more a by-product of the nation's agrarian past than a longstanding policy preference for 36 At the root of this across-the-board deductibility was a conflict between congressional tax policy and the practical limitations of the tax collection and reporting system in the early 1900s. 37 Congress in 1913 sought to encourage business investment by allowing individuals to deduct interest from business-related debt. 38 However, the inability to easily distinguish between personal and business assets in the early twentieth century made it less administratively burdensome to permit deductions for interest on all loans. 39 Use of the deduction for mortgage interest would have been de minimis at that time because few taxpayers had any tax liability and those that did typically purchased their homes with cash. 40 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 did away with the broad deduction for personal interest but maintained a specific deduction for mortgage interest. homes provide a major share of their assets. 47 Because homeowners can use equity in their homes-rather than direct support from government programs-to weather tough times, retire securely, or achieve other social welfare objectives, some characterize homeownership itself as a form of "private social insurance."
48 Accordingly, government subsidies for private homeownership may replace some of the direct spending necessary to achieve similar social welfare outcomes. 49 Beyond economic advantages, homeownership also provides a number of "spillover" social benefits, 50 such as increased political activity, greater awareness of environmental issues, and better health outcomes. 51 These secondary benefits also extend to the children of homeowners, who experience higher cognitive achievement in math and reading, 52 as well as higher graduation rates. 53 These cognitive and educational outcomes correlate with fewer behavioral problems and incidents of deviant behavior. 54 Hacker places approaches to social welfare on a spectrum ranging from direct provision to pure market allocation and identifies tax breaks as a chief means for government to encourage private behavior that enhances social welfare. See id.
49. See Conley & Gifford, supra note 48, at 75. The logical end to this argument-if the mortgage interest deduction actually increases homeownership-is that ending the deduction might require increased direct social welfare spending in the future, mitigating at least a very minor portion of the fiscal impact of repealing the provision. See id. As discussed in Part III, however, the mortgage interest deduction actually fails to increase homeownership and contributes to the type of housing market instability and poor financial decisionmaking that put Americans at greater risk of financial ruin.
50 Beyond its tangible advantages, owning real property is also intimately connected to foundational social and political values held since the founding of the Republic, namely, economic autonomy and political freedom.
57
Homeownership remains a central component of the modern American conception of autonomy and social mobility, otherwise known as the "American Dream."
58 Indeed, owning a home is both a stand-alone aspect of the American Dream and fully integrated with that ideal's other facetseducational opportunity, social mobility, financial security, and a secure retirement 59 -because the spillover benefits of homeownership provide meaningful support to families seeking those other social goods.
60
In spite of its popularity and the natural political protection afforded to the deduction by its association with the American Dream, the mortgage interest deduction and homeownership have serious social and economic implications that Congress cannot ignore. . . despite the federalist and antifederalist differences among them, expounded on the interdependent, and often reinforcing, relationships among property ownership, economic autonomy, and political freedom."). Korff argues, however, that the actual connection between property ownership, economic autonomy, and political freedom valued by the founding generation is significantly weaker or nonexistent today because property largely serves residential rather than economically productive purposes, as it did during the eighteenth century. 
III. MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION DOWNSIDES AND REPLACEMENT POLICIES
Although homeownership may provide some societal benefits, the home mortgage interest deduction is an ineffective and ultimately harmful approach to increasing homeownership. 62 The deduction fails to increase homeownership rates, is the second most expensive "tax expenditure" in the Code, and incentivizes flawed housing and investment choices that drive up home prices and encourage suburban sprawl.
63
For those reasons, fiscal and tax reform commissions appointed by both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama have found that the mortgage interest deduction is a provision in need of reform.
64
A. Costs
For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates the home mortgage interest tax deduction will result in $484.1 billion of reduced revenue to the U.S. Treasury, making it the second costliest deduction in the tax code. 65 That amount represents approximately 8.6% of federal tax expenditures for that period.
66 For fiscal year 2011, the cost of the mortgage interest deduction represented approximately 7.2% of the of the year's budget deficit of $1.3 trillion. 67 Alone, those percentages may seem small, but when characterized as a subsidy for homeownership, the mortgage interest deduction represents more than twice the amount of direct spending on federal housing programs. 68 
B. An Ineffective Homeownership Policy
The primary justification for the mortgage interest deduction is encouraging homeownership, but comparative evidence suggests that the deduction has little to no effect on the U.S. homeownership rate. 71 In 2005, 69% of Americans owned their homes. 72 Other developed countries without mortgage interest deductions had comparable rates, including the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. 73 Those comparably high ownership rates suggest that mortgage interest subsidies are not necessary to achieve broad homeownership. 74 One reason the mortgage interest deduction has little impact on the homeownership rate is that lower income households, whether they own a home or not, are unlikely to itemize their taxes. 75 Thus, for renters on the cusp of being able to afford to buy a home, the deduction fails to provide the marginal benefit necessary to move them from renting to owning. 76 Beyond the itemization barrier, those on the margin of buying If those renters did purchase homes, they would likely be part of the 28% of homeowners who do not benefit from the mortgage interest deduction due to the itemization barrier. See Sahadi, supra note 1. In contrast, the "full benefits" of the deduction are more readily counted on by households likely to itemize their deductions-those with higher incomes. ZANDI, supra note 46, at 51.
homes are further disadvantaged because the deduction increases the cost of housing, pricing some buyers out of the housing market. 77 Given its inability to actually increase homeownership, the mortgage interest deduction "is really not a pro-homeownership policy in any meaningful sense."
78
C. A Regressive Provision with Harmful Side Effects
Although the rate structure of the U.S. tax system is moderately progressive, 79 the mortgage interest deduction favors higher income earners in a way that reduces progressivity. 80 For example, in 2008, 72% of households with mortgages claimed the mortgage interest deduction. 81 And although taxpayers earning over $200,000 made up only 11% of the households claiming the deduction, those taxpayers' subsidies amounted to 32% of the total cost of the mortgage interest deduction. 82 The disproportionate cost of providing the deduction to higher income taxpayers results in part from the larger value of deductions to those taxpayers. 83 The average deduction value demonstrates the discrepancy in the deduction's benefit to higher income and middle class earners. 84 In 2004, for households with incomes of over $200,000, the average deduction was greater than $5,000. 85 Meanwhile, the average home mortgage deduction for taxpayers in all income brackets, including in the former group, was $591. 86 The discrepancy in the value of the deduction based on income is more dramatically demonstrated by the $33, 246 Because of the itemization barrier and the fact that more income means higher benefits, the mortgage interest deduction is an "upside-down subsidy"-taxpayers with historically high homeownership rates are the ones that receive the largest subsidies. 88 As Professor Roberta Mann points out, Congress would never adopt a direct-payment housing subsidy providing $5,000 to those making over $200,000 while most American homeowners receive less than $600. 89 These tremendous subsidies encourage many homeowners to purchase larger, more costly homes than they would otherwise. 90 Consider this example of how the deduction encourages the purchase of more expensive homes: Damon, who makes $100,000 per year, has $30,000 for a down payment, and pays a 28% tax rate, considers buying one of two homes. House A is valued at $300,000, and House B is valued at $350,000. With a fixed interest rate of 4%, if Damon buys House A, he will receive a benefit of $54,300 from the mortgage interest deduction over the life of the loan. 91 However, if Damon buys House B, his benefit over the life of the loan would be approximately $64,400.
92 After accounting for the 40ad-aa84-334fdd6a5e1f. As striking as that subsidy level may seem, the most symbolic excess of the deduction is that it does not just subsidize brick and mortar homes, but yachts used as residences as well. 92. Mortgage Payment Calculator Results for a $320,000, Thirty-Year, Fixed-Rate Loan at 4% Interest, BANKRATE.COM, http://www.bankrate.com/calculators/mortgages /mortgage-calculator.aspx (input "320,000" as "Mortgage Amount"; then input "30" as "Mortgage Term"; then input "4" as "Interest Rate"; then click "Show/Recalculate Amortization Table" ). The total interest for a $320,000 loan on House B is $229,982.42. differences in principal and accrued interest, the mortgage interest deduction reduces the cost differential between Houses A and B by approximately $10,000 over the life of the loan. 93 In other words, Damon can buy the more expensive of the two homes, and the federal government will subsidize him for a portion of the additional cost. By encouraging prospective buyers like Damon to buy larger homes than they might otherwise, the mortgage interest deduction promotes suburban sprawl and the negative externalities associated with it-decreases in open space, increases in auto-related greenhouse gas emissions, and diminished vitality in urban cores. 94 In short, the mortgage interest deduction allows those who would likely buy homes anyhow to purchase larger, more expensive homes.
95
Subsidizing homeownership through the mortgage interest deduction also drives housing inflation, pricing many buyers out of the market.
96
The inflationary impact of the deduction is most acute in regions where housing stock is limited, increasing prices by as much as 10%. 97 Because the mortgage interest deduction contributes to higher housing prices, it actually reduces homeownership in inelastic housing markets. This disparity encourages investors to move capital toward residential assets rather than more productive capital goods. 103 A JCT study modeling individual tax reform both with and without housing subsidies suggests that housing does indeed displace other investment 104 and that long-run gross domestic product (GDP) would be higher without housing deductions.
105
D. Is Homeownership Worth Subsidizing?
Setting aside the negative consequences of the mortgage interest deduction, should the federal government subsidize homeownership at all? Although owning a home may provide wealth and financial stability in the long run, 106 a home is also an "anchor" 107 that does not provide income and requires significant transaction costs for purchase and sale.
108
These transaction costs, along with neighborhood ties, restrain homeowners a large impact on total savings, although it clearly plays an important role in determining where the money is invested.").
101 118 Second, Congress could convert the mortgage interest deduction to a tax credit. 119 Two presidential commissions and a number of think tanks have endorsed such an approach 120 because credits are not subject to the itemization barrier 121 and reduce tax liability dollar-for-dollar. 122 Transforming the deduction into a credit would also provide a considerable source with which to offset tax rate cuts or reduce the deficit, though far less than elimination. 123 Third, Congress could retain the deduction but make modifications like lowering the $1.1 million cap, ending deductibility of home equity interest, 124 or removing the subsidy for second homes and yachts.
125 Some changes, like disallowing the deduction for yachts or second homes, would have a minor budgetary impact but address the more notorious excesses of the current deduction. 126 Proponents of each of these three approaches argue that the policy they advocate will ameliorate one or more of the negative aspects of the deduction under current law. 127 Many commentators, however, fail to fully account for the short-term impact of adopting their preferred policy, such as how it will affect property values. 128 But the short-term effects of a policy change should not be ignored; Congress might forgo an overhaul of the mortgage interest deduction if there is no apparent suitable way to reform the deduction without harming the housing market or homeowners.
Contra I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (2006) (exempting mortgage debt from characterization as nondeductible personal interest
129
For that reason, Congress should simultaneously evaluate ideal longterm policies and explore options for minimizing the impact on property values. 130 In previous tax reform efforts, Congress has adopted transition relief policies designed to ameliorate some of the hardship caused by the new laws. 131 In order to understand which policies to adopt, however, the objectives and potential impact of changing the mortgage interest deduction must be clear.
F. Implications of Changing the Mortgage Interest Deduction
Long-Term Considerations
In deciding how to treat mortgage debt under the tax code, Congress should look to basic tax reform principles as its primary criteria. The objectives of a comprehensive tax overhaul include promoting economic (indicating that disallowing mortgage interest deductions for second homes would have added $7.8 billion in revenue from 2002 to 2011).
127. See, e.g., Ventry, supra note 33, at 283 (stating that replacing the mortgage interest deduction with a tax credit would "tie the subsidy to need rather than marginal tax rates, reduce complexity in taxpaying and tax administration by reducing itemizers," and "if permitted by budgetary realities, allow for rate reduction").
128. See, e.g., id. at 277-84. But see Mathias, supra note 19, at 70-72 (discussing the need for and options for transition relief in eliminating the mortgage interest deduction). That is not to say, however, that long-term considerations are not important. Indeed, two of the most salient reasons for eliminating the deduction, reducing housing inflation and preventing future housing bubbles, are important long-term considerations. 130. See SHILLER, supra note 15, at 84 ("The idea that public policy should be aimed at validating the real estate myth, preventing a collapse in home prices from ever happening, is an error of the first magnitude. In the short run a sudden drop in home prices may indeed disrupt the economy, producing undesirable systemic effects. But, in the long run, the home-price drops are clearly a good thing.").
131 As a second criteria, Congress must also address those aspects of our tax system that contributed to the burst of the 2000s housing bubble and the Great Recession. 134 Congress has already taken steps to address some mortgage excesses, 135 and in 2011 the Obama Administration proposed winding down mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 136 The federal government should not repeat the mistakes of the previous housing bubble by failing to change laws that stimulate unsafe overinvestment in housing.
137 Accordingly, the mortgage interest deduction should be one aspect of broader housing policy reform. 
Short-Term Considerations
Whatever long-term tax policy Congress chooses, lawmakers must also account for the impact such a policy would have short term. A serious argument against changing the mortgage interest deduction is that doing 137. See SHILLER, supra note 15, at 3-4 (discussing the American failure to identify and respond to speculative bubbles).
138. See HARDAWAY, supra note 15, at 172 (recommending policies to address conditions that led to the housing bubble). so will decrease property values during an already-weak housing market. 139 Further, the centrality of housing to the overall economy makes changes in housing-related tax policy a major point of concern for policymakers. 140 Accordingly, the state of the housing market should be an important but not overstated consideration in determining how to alter the mortgage interest deduction. 141 Currently, the U.S. housing market is still recovering from the burst of the housing bubble in 2007, which caused a severe and sustained drop in home prices. 142 The housing sector is, however, finally starting to turn around, 143 and forecasters expect home prices to grow by approximately 3.8% from the third quarter of 2012 to the third quarter of 2013. 144 Although the bottom of the housing market may be behind us, symptoms of housing market fragility remain. 145 During the first quarter of 2012, 31.4% of homes with mortgages were underwater. 146 These homeowners owed more on their mortgages than their homes were worth, 147 a circumstance that increases the chance of default. 148 In short, foreclosures remain at elevated levels 149 and the slow turnaround in the housing market continues to pose a challenge to the economic recovery. 150 Housing market health is key to economic growth and stability because of its outsized and interconnected role in the U.S. economy. 151 Housing market weakness heavily affects residential construction, state and local [VOL. 49: 1333 [VOL. 49: , 2012 Transition Relief for Tax Reform's Third Rail SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW government funding, and consumer spending. 152 For example, during the housing boom, the residential construction industry boosted real GDP by approximately 0.5%.
153 Accordingly, when the housing market faltered, the homebuilding decline led to decreased demand for building materials and less construction on related projects, such as infrastructure and schools. 154 
IV. OPTIONS FOR REFORMING THE DEDUCTION IN A FRAGILE HOUSING MARKET
In light of the weaknesses of the mortgage interest deduction discussed in Part III, Congress should adopt a new tax policy toward mortgage debt. But because the housing market remains fragile, tax policy changes affecting the housing market must provide suitable transition relief to ensure that the housing market recovery is not unduly disrupted. As discussed below, completely eliminating the mortgage interest deduction best accomplishes the principles animating tax reform and more sustainable long-term housing market growth. Should Congress decide to continue subsidizing mortgage interest through the tax code, however, it should convert the deduction to a credit or substantially modify the deduction, in that order of preference. Congress can minimize any housing market disruption these policies might cause by concurrently adopting transition policies to protect property values and homeowners.
155
A. Option 1: Eliminate the Deduction
Long-Term Advantages and Disadvantages
As the discussion in Part III reveals, the mortgage interest deduction is a costly, regressive tax provision that fails to achieve its primary objective.
156
Rather than increasing homeownership, the deduction stimulates overinvestment in real estate and inflates home prices, which 152. ZANDI, supra note 46, at 216-17. Because many consumers make expenditures in part using the equity in their homes, falling home prices constrain overall consumer spending. See Unlike a modification of the deduction or conversion to a tax credit, complete elimination broadens the tax base most significantly. 159 This broader tax base conforms with comprehensive tax reform priorities, 160 as well as the principles of neutrality and efficiency. 161 By eliminating the deduction and moving the tax system closer to neutrality, this approach would represent an important step in ending federal government policies that contributed to the housing bubble. 162 When mortgage interest is nondeductible, taxpayers prioritize paying down their mortgages more quickly. 163 One example of that effect is in Australia, which has no deduction for mortgage interest. 164 Although the amount of mortgage debt Australian homeowners take on is similar to their American counterparts, homeowners in that country paid down mortgage debt more quickly than in the United States. 165 These types of household shifts in spending priorities to pay down mortgages have important benefits for homeowners and the economy. 166 First, homeowners who pay off their mortgages more quickly feel more financially secure and are typically in better financial shape because they have less outstanding debt. 167 Second, although a shift to paying down [VOL. 49: 1333 [VOL. 49: , 2012 Transition Relief for Tax Reform's Third Rail SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW mortgages will slow debt-driven consumer spending in the overall economy, that type of spending can become too excessive. 168 During rosy economic periods, many homeowners spend abundantly rather than pay down tax-privileged mortgage debt. 169 For example, many homeowners during the last housing boom spent 10% more than they took in. 170 But when the housing market crashed and the broader economy floundered, consumers had to cut personal spending, landing another blow to an economy accustomed to consumer excess. 171 A neutral tax policy that does not favor mortgage debt will help assuage substantial booms and busts like those encouraged by the current policy.
172
A significant advantage of eliminating the deduction rather than replacing it with a credit or modifying it is that elimination provides Congress with the greatest amount of revenue flexibility with which to lower tax rates, cut the deficit, or invest in more targeted, nontax homeownership programs.
173 If the deduction had been eliminated in 2010, it would have resulted in between $879 billion and $1.26 trillion in increased revenue over ten years, producing significant revenue to direct toward the aforementioned purposes. 174 invest. Instead of piling into the next new thing, we should be diversifying away from whatever is appreciating quickly.").
168. See Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green). 169. See ZANDI, supra note 46, at 217-18; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 152, at 6 tbl.1 (showing consumers' general propensity to increase spending using housing wealth).
170. ZANDI, supra note 46, at 218. 171. See id. at 218-19. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a price decline of 10% could, by itself, decrease GDP by between 0.4% and 1.4%. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 152, at 12 tbl.2.
172. See Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Dr. Richard K. Green). 173. If Congress did wish to maintain a small, targeted incentive for homeownership that only provides a subsidy for those on the cusp of buying a home, one such proposal is to invest in state-based trust funds that would provide downpayment assistance to eligible homeowners and share home equity proceeds with the homeowner. . Jacobus and Abramowitz argue that an advantage of this approach is that it weeds out homeowners who do not need homeownership assistance because participants would be required to share the equity in their home with the trust fund in order to replenish the fund. See id. at 318.
174. TODER ET AL., supra note 121, at 18 tbl.1. The variability in the revenue projections is due to two things: (1) whether researchers account for behavioral modifications resulting from the deduction's elimination, such as selling taxable assets in order to pay down mortgage debt, and (2) whether current tax policies such as the Bush tax cuts and patch for the alternative minimum tax are extended. See id. at 8, 18 tbl.1.
Without a decrease in marginal tax rates-though that is not the object of this Comment-a strict elimination of the mortgage interest deduction would result in higher tax liability. 175 However, because the mortgage interest deduction disproportionately favors higher income groups, the percentage change in after-tax income would affect higher income groups more greatly than lower and middle income groups.
176 If the deduction were simply eliminated, the average household in the middle-income quintile earning $43,678 in after-tax income would have an increased liability of $215, or approximately 0.5%. 177 Those in the fourth-highest quintile earning $71,839 would pay $689 more, a change in liability of approximately 1%. 178 Meanwhile, for households in the ninety-fifth to ninety-ninth percentile earning $259,935, the increase would be $4,234, or approximately 1.6% of after-tax income. 179 The greatest advantage eliminating the mortgage interest deduction offers is less housing market volatility and greater affordability in the long run. For example, eliminating the mortgage interest deduction and property tax deduction would actually increase the homeownership rate of young Americans in urban areas because those deductions actually raise home prices by an amount greater than the decrease in tax liability they provide. 180 In high-cost regions, where the deduction has the greatest inflationary effect, eliminating the deduction will cause the greatest drop in home prices. 181 In the long run, however, those price decreases will make owning a home easier in places like California. 182 Accordingly, eliminating the mortgage interest deduction will result in greater market-based allocation of resources and lower, stabilized home prices in the long run. 183 Further, by eliminating the deduction, Congress
The $879 billion figure represents a model with behavior changes and extension of current policies. Id. at 18 tbl.1. The $1.26 trillion figure represents a model of static behavior and no extension of current policies. 
Short-Term Consequences
In the short-run, an immediate elimination of the mortgage interest deduction would lower home prices and extend economic pain caused by the burst of the housing bubble, financial crisis, and Great Recession. 185 Not surprisingly, considering evidence that the mortgage interest deduction contributes to housing inflation, 186 studies on eliminating the mortgage interest deduction suggest home prices would drop between 2% and 13% nationally, with significant variations by region. 187 Thus, immediately eliminating housing subsidies would generally lower home prices and increase negative equity, 188 which would undermine consumer confidence and spending. 189 On a national scale, these "transition losses"
190 accompanying a sudden elimination of the mortgage interest deduction-depending on the timing of its effective date-could slow appreciation or cause depreciation in the housing market. 191 Even if Congress were to eliminate the deduction in a comprehensive tax reform package that lowered tax rates and offset the cost of mortgage interest with lower tax liability, taxpayers would still begin to divest in housing and shift investments toward more economically productive assets. 192 Further, looking beyond the macroeconomic effects of eliminating the deduction, many homeowners purchased homes with the expectation that they could deduct mortgage interest in the future. 193 Changing the subsidy too quickly or dramatically would impose unfair hardship. 194 If, for example, Congress immediately eliminated the deduction without any related drop in marginal tax rates, 195 a household expecting the deduction would be subject to a dual financial blow: a drop in home equity and higher tax liability.
196 Without lowering marginal rates, that change would result in $215 in increased tax liability for households earning about $44,000 in after-tax income.
197
For households earning approximately $72,000 in after-tax income, the change could increase tax liability by an average of $689.
198
Depending on how Congress structured rate cuts in tax reform, taxpayers may be satisfied with overall lower tax rates and liability but no mortgage interest deduction. 199 For example, the plan put forward by the Bipartisan Policy Center would change the current tax system, consolidating the current rate structure-six rates ranging from 10% to 39.6%-to two rates-15% and 27%. 200 Those going from a higher rate to a lower one may forgive not being able to deduct mortgage interest if the reform delivers overall lower tax liability. 201 Thus, fairness and reliance concerns about ending the deduction could, for many taxpayers, be addressed by decreases in the marginal tax rate. However, homeowners would still be subject to a modest decrease in home prices and related 
Appropriate Transition Relief
In eliminating the home mortgage interest deduction, Congress would be wise to adopt transition relief capable of gradually eliminating the deduction without shocking the housing market.
203
Using transition policies for tax changes is common, 204 and basic methods include phasingin, delaying, or grandfathering a law's effective date. 205 To determine what, if any, transition relief to provide, policymakers must evaluate the type of transition losses or windfall gains the new law will likely cause.
206
For example, in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress disallowed deductions for investment interest in excess of net investment income but gradually phased in the disallowance by set percentages for tax years 1987 through 1990. 207 A properly structured transition policy can minimize concerns about eliminating the mortgage interest deduction by preventing a sudden increase in tax liability for individual taxpayers, minimizing disruption of the housing market, and reducing the likelihood that businesses and individuals affected by the change will resist it. 208 One proposal is to phase out the mortgage interest deduction by reducing the cap on qualified residence debt from $1 million by increments of $100,000 over a ten-year period. 209 For homeowners, a phase-out would provide time to plan for the decrease and gradually encourage homeowners to pay down their mortgages more quickly. 210 For the housing market, a phase-out would provide an orderly, long-range drawdown and affect housing prices slowly, impacting only the highest-valued homes first. 211 Relatedly, phasing out the deduction provides housing-related industries, such as real estate sales and residential construction, with adequate time to adjust their business activities. 212 An additional benefit of a phase-out is that, like the temporary 2008-2010 homebuyer tax credit, it might provide current renters looking to purchase a home with a marginal incentive to do so sooner rather than later in order to take advantage of the deduction before it disappears.
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On the other hand, because eliminating the mortgage interest deduction will cause more dramatic decreases in home prices in high-cost regions, 214 and those regions would be impacted by a phase-out first, other potential homeowners might wait to purchase homes until anticipated price decreases set in. 215 Thus, a phase-out might cause some potential homeowners to purchase a home sooner, whereas others in high-cost areas might stay on the sidelines in anticipation of noticeably lower prices following a phase-out. 217 and a sudden end to the deduction for most homeowners at the end of the decade. First, as an example, if Congress initiated the phase-out in 2014, gradually eliminating the deduction would increase revenues by a total of only $14 billion in the first three years. 218 In contrast, the subsequent five years would see a total of $215 billion in revenue.
219 Accordingly, unless Congress structured tax reform to increase the deficit in the near-term and decrease the deficit as revenues from the phase-out increased, any tax rate reduction would have to be more modest at the outset as well. 220 Second, as the transition decade reached an end, the phase-out would affect a broad swath of homeowners whose mortgage debt approximated the median home price of between $200,000 and $300,000.
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For example, based on 2009 home values, cutting the cap on the deduction by $100,000 per year for the first five years will affect fewer than 10% of U.S. homeowners. 222 Meanwhile, in the eighth year alone, the cap decrease from $300,000 to $200,000 would affect nearly 18% of homeowners. 223 Congress might desire this phase-out structure to place the most immediate transition losses on those homeowners with the most expensive homes, delay the impact on those with modestly priced homes, and postpone the impact on a broad swath of the housing market. One alternative would be to decrease the cap according to the percentage of U.S. owner-occupied homes affected each year. Thus, in the first year, the cap would be reduced to approximately $500,000, impacting about 10% of homeowners. 225 From there, year-to-year decreases in the dollar value of the cap would slow as they approached the median home value in the fifth year. 226 Because this approach would affect more homeowners with high-value deductions sooner in the transition decade, it would also provide greater revenue up front and more flexibility in offsetting tax rate decreases. 227 This also has the advantage of not back loading the impact of the phase-out such that it hits a large number of taxpayers in a one to two year period.
As another alternative, Congress could structure the phase-out to equalize the revenue impact over a defined period. For example, if the deduction would result in $879 billion in lost revenue over a ten-year period, 228 Congress could structure the phase-out to raise $87.9 billion per year over that same period. This would ease rate-reduction planning.
Whether Congress chooses to phase out the deduction by a nominal amount, by the percentage of homeowners impacted, or in a manner that equalizes revenues, beginning any phase-out during a weak housing market may undermine recoveries in the housing market and the broader economy. 229 For that reason, some suggest Congress should adopt additional transition relief in the form of a trigger tied to the health of the housing market. 230 For example, Richard K. Green proposes that phasing out the mortgage interest deduction "not begin until the Federal Housing Finance Agency's house price index shows year-over-year growth equal to the rate of consumer price index growth." 231 Creating an automatic trigger for the phase-out serves two purposes. 232 First, by delaying initiation of the phase-out, Congress can avoid "shocking" the housing market as it only begins to recover from a prolonged slump. 233 Second, it ensures that the new law will gradually go into effect only after sustained growth occurs rather than on an arbitrary future date. 234 Although home prices are largely seen to have turned the corner in mid-2012, unforeseen events could trigger another price slide or extremely slow growthphenomena the trigger, but not a nominal date, could react to. 235 This combined approach to transition-delaying the effective date and gradually phasing out the deduction-is particularly appropriate where Congress is concerned about dramatic transition losses affecting efficiency and fairness, as it should be in eliminating the mortgage interest deduction. 236 
Although
[r]eliance is generally not considered important when a small change is enacted . . . [, a]s the magnitude of the change increases, the potential for significant financial losses also increases, and greater concern is voiced for those who might have altered their behavior to take advantage of the prior law. Delayed or phased-in effective dates may reduce the financial impact of such a change. 237 Beyond being gentler to homeowners and the housing market, this delicate approach does present Congress with certain complications in reforming the tax code. 238 First, the primary disadvantage of delaying and gradually eliminating the mortgage interest deduction is that it fails to deliver a large infusion of revenue with which to offset lower tax rates or decrease the deficit. 239 Second, by tying the effective date to a housing market trigger rather than adopting a nominal effective date, Congress would complicate the task of forecasting when even a portion of the revenue from the deduction's elimination would become available.
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B. Option 2: Replace the Deduction with a Tax Credit
Long-Term Advantages and Disadvantages
There are three advantages to "credifying" tax expenditures such as the mortgage interest deduction: (1) all qualifying homeowners, whether they itemize or not, would receive a benefit for mortgage interest, 241 (2) the magnitude of the credit's benefit for each taxpayer would be transparent, 242 and (3) credits provide more progressivity than deductions. 243 First, a tax credit is a more equitable policy because taxpayers would not be subject to the itemization barrier to claim the benefit, as they are with the deduction. 244 As previously discussed, more than a quarter of homeowners are ineligible to claim the mortgage interest deduction because their itemized deductions do not exceed the value of the standard deduction. 245 If Congress reconstituted the deduction as a credit, the benefit could reach lower and middle income, nonitemizing homeowners 246 and would provide a greater incentive for renters to purchase a home if claiming the benefit were a certainty. Returning to a previous example, 250 Alice and Ben each purchased homes with $200,000 mortgages at 5% interest, resulting in $10,000 in interest in the first year. Alice received a $2,800 tax benefit compared to Ben's $1,500 benefit because Alice pays a higher tax rate. Under a mortgage interest credit of 15%, Alice and Ben would receive the same $1,500 tax benefit because the difference in their respective tax rates does not affect the value of the benefit.
Third, because taxpayers with higher incomes would not receive disproportionately larger benefits than those with lower incomes, a mortgage interest credit restores the progressivity the rate structure was designed to achieve. 251 Despite its advantages over current law, turning the deduction into a credit also has two primary downsides when compared to eliminating the mortgage interest deduction: (1) unless the credit is small, it would fail to substantially broaden the tax base, and (2) it would continue to incentivize housing investment over more productive assets. First, transforming the deduction into a credit would undermine the comprehensiveness of tax simplification and result in less revenue to cut marginal rates or reduce the deficit. 252 Although replacing the deduction with a 15% tax credit would provide approximately $388 billion over six years 253 -a not insignificant amount-it would provide far less than complete elimination, which would net between $879 billion and $1.26 trillion over ten years. 254 Second, because it would continue to provide a tax subsidy, a home mortgage interest credit would continue to incentivize investment in housing above other assets. 255 Relatedly, because the credit would make mortgage subsidies more readily available to current nonitemizers, replacing the deduction with a credit may simply shift the inflationary effect of the deduction from high-priced residences to less expensive homes. 
Short-Term Consequences
If Congress replaces the home mortgage interest deduction with a tax credit that continues to provide all current beneficiaries with mortgage interest subsidies, transition losses will be significantly lower than under complete elimination of the deduction. 257 Like modifying the deduction by lowering the cap, replacing the deduction with a credit would more likely affect high-income earners who could absorb the full cost of interest on their mortgages more readily than lower and middle income homeowners. 258 
Appropriate Transition Relief
If structured appropriately, changing homeownership subsidies from a deduction to a credit could be a form of permanent transition relief for most homeowners because many would actually see an increase in aftertax income. 259 For example, replacing the deduction with a refundable credit equal to 17.1% of home mortgage interest paid would result in net income increases for those in the bottom four income quintiles. 260 Relatedly, reconstituting the deduction as a credit would primarily increase tax liability for high-income earners. 261 The overall effect on the housing market would depend on the size of the credit and regional housing costs.
Although the need for transition relief is much less stark in the context of replacing the mortgage interest deduction with a tax credit, Congress could still employ some form of gradual transition relief, such as a phase-in or trigger. 262 Along those lines, the Congressional Budget Office provided an option to replace the deduction with a 15% tax credit in 2013 and gradually lower the cap on deductible interest by $100,000 increments from $1 million in 2013 to a final cap of $500,000. 263 Another alternative is to phase in the credit while phasing out the deduction over five years. 264 For example, in the first year, a taxpayer eligible for the mortgage interest deduction would receive 80% of the value of the deduction and 20% of the value of the new credit. 265 The deduction value would decrease by 20% each year while the credit value would increase by the same amount until the credit completely eclipses the deduction. 266 Like other phase-outs, this proposal would provide a gradual change for homeowners and the housing market. 267 Phasing out the deduction and gradually replacing it with a tax credit could also be paired with Green's housing stability trigger in order to provide an additional layer of transition relief to avoid shocking the real estate market. 268 A trigger may be problematic, however, if Congress chooses to replace the deduction with a credit because some potential homebuyers might put off buying a home until a credit is available. 269 For example, a renter looking to buy a home who does not itemize her taxes might wait for the deduction to become a credit before making a purchase. 270 Accordingly, a triggered credit may keep potential homebuyers on the sidelines and counterproductively prolong housing market ills.
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Considering this, and the overall low transition losses gradually replacing the deduction with a credit would cause, Congress should forgo adopting a trigger alongside a credit.
C. Option 3: Substantially Modify the Deduction
Long-Run Advantages and Disadvantages
The last option for changing the mortgage interest deduction is to modify how the deduction works. The modification with the greatest budgetary impact would be to reduce the cap on deductible acquisition debt from its current $1 million level. 272 For example, Senator Tom Coburn proposes decreasing the amount of acquisition debt eligible for the deduction from $1 million per couple to $500,000 per couple, which would raise approximately $187 billion over ten years.
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Coburn's proposal would also limit the deduction to mortgages on a single residence, rather than the two permitted under current law, and would eliminate the deductibility of interest on home equity debt. 274 Other proposals involve lowering the cap, but adjusting the limit regionally to account for local home prices. 275 Lowering the cap on the amount of debt eligible for a deduction would address one aspect of regressivity-taxpayers purchasing residences over $500,000 would no longer be subsidized for the portion of their mortgage between $500,000 and $1 million, as current law permits. 276 However, the primary disadvantage of retaining the mortgage interest subsidy as a deduction is that it would continue to prevent nonitemizing lower and middle income homeowners from benefitting. 277 Further, although eliminating the deduction for home equity debt would remove a tax incentive to take on nonacquisition debt, a scaled-back deduction would still incentivize overinvestment in housing to the detriment of investment in more productive capital goods. 
Short-Term Consequences
Unlike the consequences of eliminating the home mortgage interest deduction, immediate modification of the deduction would not necessitate dramatic transition relief because it will likely not affect many homeowners. 279 For example, modifying the deduction by lowering the cap to $500,000 would result in fewer transition losses than complete elimination because it would only affect the fewer than 10% of homeowners whose residences are valued at over $500,000. 280 Lowering the cap on eligible mortgage debt to $500,000 would primarily affect regions with high-priced markets, such as San Francisco, but to a lesser extent than mortgage debt, subsidizing housing through the tax code needlessly continues policies that contributed to the housing crisis from which the U.S. economy is still recovering.
By gradually eliminating the deduction over a period of years and not initiating the drawdown of mortgage subsidies until the housing market exhibits sustained growth, Congress can achieve worthy short-run and long-run goals. In the short-term, the housing market will be protected from shock, while current homeowners and incumbent real estate-related businesses that relied on the existence of the deduction can adjust to its elimination gradually. In the long run, investment and housing prices will adjust to market-allocated levels, resulting in more economic productivity and more affordable housing for future generations.
Eliminating the deduction altogether provides important benefits that merely modifying the deduction or replacing it with a credit cannot. Entirely eliminating the deduction provides a maximum infusion of revenue with which to lower marginal tax rates, decrease the budget deficit, provide targeted homeownership assistance, or all of the above. Further, a tax credit or mere modification of the deduction would continue to distort investment in favor of housing rather than more efficient market-allocated investments. Eventual elimination increases economic efficiency and productivity and provides the maximum benefit to the economy and the long-term health of the American housing market. Nevertheless, even if Congress declined to completely eliminate the mortgage interest deduction, turning the deduction into a credit or substantially modifying the deduction would be superior to current law.
